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Abstract. The notion of interpretability of some classical first-order theory in a temporal theory 
(i.e. a theory over a first-order temporal logic language) is formally defined. For this, techniques 
for extending theories by new function symbols have to be adopted from classical logic. Some 
interpretability results for classical arithmetical theories are proved together with results about 
categorical axiomatizations of arithmetic within temporal logic. As a corollary, two new incom- 
pleteness results for first-order temporal iogic are derived. The investigations are carried out with 
respect to two different semantical frameworks of temporal logic and request slightly different 
techniques in both cases. 
1. Introduction 
Besides its usefulness in the field of specification and verification of parallel 
programs (cf. [Z-4]), ttmporal logic has also turned out to be, in its first-order 
version, a very powerful logicai language. Particularly, in [7] it is shown that usual 
Peano arithmetic can be uniquely characterized in such a language containing 
equality and the symbols 0, s, +, * for the natural number “zero” and the successor, 
addition and multiplication functions, respectively. 
In the present paper we want to take a closer look at this describability of arithmetic 
in first-order temporal logic. We show that the results of [7] can be strengthened 
more or less, depending on what kind of quantification is allowed. Furthermore it 
turns out that for different semantic definitions of the logic (which are commonly 
used in the literature), the results are partly achieved in slightly different technical 
ways. 
In order to be more precise about what we mean by arithmetic, let us first recall 
some basic notions and notations from classical ogic. Let 2 be a j-irst-or&-r ~~~g~~g~ 
with equality, i.e. the alphabet of 9 consists of denumerably many variables, for 
every n E NO at most denumerably many n-aryfunction symbols (also called constants 
fn the case II = 0) and, for n > 0: at most denumerably 
symbol =, connectives li 
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of 2. Terms of d;p are built from variables by “applying” function symbols, and 
formulas of Y are either aromicformulus, i.e. “applications” of predicate symbols 
to terms, or built from these using connectives and parentheses. A j%st-order fheory 
T= (2, ,&) is given by 2’ and a set ~-4 of formulas of 2, called the (nodo@d) 
axioms of T. 
Let now ZpA be a language with the signature consisting of the constant 0, the 
unary function symbol s and the binary function symbols +, 2~. The theory PA= 
(LfPPA, SapA) with the following set z$ rA of axioms is called (jirst-order) Peano- 
arirhmetic: 
(PAI) Vx(s(x) # 01, 
(PA2) VxVy(s(x) = s(y) -+ x = y), 
(PA3) Vx(x+O=x), 
(PA4) VxVy(x+s(y) = s(x+y)), 
(PAS) Vx(x * 0 = 0), 
(PA@ VxVy(x * s(y) = x * y + x), 
(PA7) (A(0) A Vx(A(x) + A(s(x)))) + VxA(x) (for every formula A(x)). 
(For any term t, A( 1) denotes the result of replacing all free occurrences of x in A 
by r, after possibly having renamed those bound variables in A which also occur 
in t. The formula s(x) # 0 is an abbreviation for is(x) = 0.) 
We will also consider a subtheory MA = (TM*, A!,& of PA which we call minimal 
arithmetic. ZMA is ZpA without + and *, and &ZMA consists of the axioms (PAl), 
(PAZ) and (PA7). As well known, there is also a theory “in between” MA and PA, 
the so-called Presburger arithmetic, but this will play no significant role in our context. 
Another well-known fact is that the theory PA is not complete, i.e. there are 
(closed) formulas A of .5!?,+, such that neither A nor 1A are theorems of PA. There 
is also a complete feano arithmetic CPA which can be defined recalling some further 
notions of classical first-order logic. 
Let 2 be a first-order language with equality. A structure 5 for 2’ consists of a 
non-empty set IS], called the universe of S, and n-ary functions S(f) : IS]” + IS] and 
relations S(p) c IS]” for the n-ary function and predicate symbols (other than =), 
respectively. A variable valuation 6 (with respect to S) assigns some e(x) E ISI to 
every variable x of 2’. For any S and 5, the truth value §(C’(A) E {f, t} of a formula 
can be defined as usual. A is then called valid in S if SfZ;‘(A) = t. The theo 
is the theory (2, 4 where & is the set of formulas of 2? which are valid i 
Let now fVpA = (No, 0, s, +, Q j be the standard model of *A, i.e. the structure with 
Pb,l =b, NPA(w =o, P*(S) = s, NPA(+) = f, A&(*) = * and , s, +, * are the 
usual “zero”, successor, addition, and multiplication functions i No, respectively. 
CPA is defined as the theory of PA. Of course, we can also restrict iVPA to 
A=(& s), the standard model of MA, and could define CMA analogously. 
since is complete this would be no reahy new theory (see, e.g. [l]). 
Finally, let us recall that two structures SI and S, for some 2’ are called isomorphic 
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, , . . . , d,, E jS,l. If and & are isomorphic then any formula A of 
, iff it is valid in S,. 
A first-order temporal language 2’ with equality is an extension of some first-order 
language 3” (with equality), called its kernel. The alphabet of Y is that of 3’ with 
(at least) the additional connectives 0 and Cl (and 0 which can be defined by El), 
and an additional denumerable set of local variables. The variables of 3’ are called 
global variables in this new context. Terms and atomic formulas are defined as in 
3’ (but also possibly using local variables). The formation rules for formulas are 
those of 3” and additionally that if A is a formula then so are OA and EIA (and 
OA). For quantification this means that 
(V) if A is a formula and ?I is a global variable then VxA is a formula. 
(For more details, see [2].) We will, however, also consider languages where quan- 
tification is also allowed over local variables, i.e. which have the syntactic rule 
(W*) if A is a formula and r is a variable (giobal or local) then VrA is a formula. 
Besides V we will also use the existential quantifiers 3 and 3,) defined as usual, 
i.e. particularly: 
3, xA(x) = 3xA(x) A VxVy(A(x) A A(y)+ x = y). 
Here we have again displayed the variables x a;ld y in A as in Section 1 and 
furthermore, we have used a priority order of the boolean connectives in order to 
save parentheses. We fix that + and * are binding less than A and v. Throughout 
the paper we will use letters x, y, z, U, v for global variables and a, b, c for local 
ones. Terms and formulas are called global if they contain no local variables. 
A temporal structure ) f~ some 2 is given by a structure S for the 
first-order kernel of 9, a global variable va4uation 5, and a denumerable sequence 
={rl0,9,,7721.- .} of local variable valuations, a14 with spect to S. For any 
iE&, a value 1 for every term t and a truth value XA) E if, t) for every 
formula A is defined as follows. 
-(x) = s(x) for every global variable x, 
( p) for p other than =, 
&(A+B)=t 
(and analogously for the other oolean c~~~ectives~, 
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(OA)=t iff 
(nA)=r iff Kj(A)=C for eveqja i, 
(OA) = 4 iff K,(A) =t for some j 2 i, 
(WxA) = t iff I(A) =t for every 
(VaA) = It iff :(A) = t for every 
(3xA) = t iff :(A) = t for some 
.(3a.A j = t iff f(A) = t for some 
Here the relations ex_,. . __ and = a,h ,... are defined by 
iff ((2) = e’(z) for every z other thhn x, y, . . . , 
‘iff vijC)= q:(c) for every i and c other than a, b, -. . . 
3, will only be used with global variables for which we tibviously have 
J3,xA) = t iff there is precisely one 
The following lemma lists some simple facts about temporal structures. 
Lemma 2.1. Let K be a temporal structure for some .Lf’, i, jEN?,, x a global variable 
and t a global term. 
(a) IfKi(VXA(X)) = t then Ki(A(t)) = t. 
roof. The proof of (a) can be found in [2]; (b) follows from (a) by juxtaposition; 
(c) and (d) are trivial from the definition, (e) follows from (c). Cl 
We now want to encounter the notion of validity of formulas (in some 
are two definitions used in the literature (cf. [4]) both of which we want t 
and we distinguish them by calling the two approaches normal semantics and initial 
semantics, respectively. 
A formula A is called valid in 
- in normal semantics (A) = t for every i E NO, 
- in initial semantics: 
It should be remarked that the notions of general validity (validity in every 
equivalent in both semantics, but this is not the case for the validity in a 
subsets of all temporal structures which we need in the following definitions. 
(jirst-order) temporal theory T= (3, .@ is given by a language 9 as above (with 
( - or (V*)-quantiliication) and a s & of formulas of 3, called the (non-logical) 
axioms of T. A temporal structure for 3’ is called a model of T (in one of the 
two semantics), if all fornsulas of Z$ are valid ifl (It should be noted that a model 
also contains a single variable valuation 5 but it can easily be made independent 
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of 5 by using only closed (w.r.t. global variables) axioms in J&) A formula A of 3 
is called theorem of T if A is valid in every model of T. 
Our aim is to show that, roughly speaking, the function symbols 0, s, +, * of the 
arithmetic theories shown in Section 1 can be “defined” in some very “poor” 
temporal theories. “Defined” is meant in a sense analogous to the meaning of this 
notion in classical first-order theories. The corresponding techniques (cf. e.g. [6]) 
can be adopted from there, but we have to carry out the transcription with some 
care, particularly with respect to the two different semantical frameworks. If not 
explicitly stated, the remaining notions and results of this section will be the same 
for both cases of which underlying temporal semantics (normal or initial) is chosen. 
Let T= (9, ~4) be a temporal theory (3 with (V)- or (V*)-quantification), 
&I,.--, x,, y) (n 3 0) a formula of 9 containing precisely x, , . . . , x,,, y as free 
global variables. Depending on the underlying semantics, the extensionfirmula Fext 
of F(x,, . . . , x,,, y) is defined to be 
- in normal semantics: the formula Vx, - - - Vx,3,y q F(x, , . . . , x,,, y), 
- in initial semantics: the formula Vx, - - - Vx,3,yF(x,, . . . , x1, y). 
Suppose now the extension formula of F is a theorem of T (within tbe corresponding 
semantics). Let f be an pt-ary function symbol not occurring in the signature of 3’. 
The theory T(f) = W(f), d(f)) w h ere Z‘(f) is 3 with the additional function 
symbol f and 
is called extension of T by definition (off). 
Let ) be a model of T. Then (F,,,) = t. Let cp : 1 
so@ 1 ,..., d,)=d,+, iff (F(xi , . . .,x,,y)jTt for s(x,)=d, (Is-j~n) 
and the (uniquely determined) t(y) = d,,+, . 
Then we can denne the temporal structure ) where S’ is the same 
as S but with the additional association ‘(f) = cp. In general, any 
where S” is the same as S for 3’ is called an extension of 
2.2. Let be a model of T. An extension is a model of T(f) iJ 
f). 
oof. In initial semantics, it is immediately clear by the construction of 
structure is a model of T(f) and that it is in fact the onl 
In normal semantics, because of u%,,...,~“,Y))=~ 
with the values for x,, , . . , x,, y as in the de~~itio~ of q 
(W,, * * . , x,,, y)) = t for all i. This s ows that the lemma *ltso 
case. Cl 
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Lemma 2.3. Let A be a formula of 2. If A is a theorem of T(f) then it is a theorem 
of T. 
a model of T and I = 0 (initial seman s) or in% (normal 
is a model of T( f ). Hence f);(A) = t and, since 
f is not contained in A, (A) = t. So A is valid in and therefore a theorem ofi. 0 
For global terms t,, . . . , t,, the formda f( I,, . _ . , t,,) = y - 
F(t , , . . . 4 t,, _v) is a theorem of T(f). 
be a mode! of T( f ), i = 0 or i E No. W’hh the additional axiom of T( f) 
and Lemma 2,1(a) we conclude that (F(t,, . . . , t,#, f(t,, . . . , t,)))=t. So if 
t,) = y) = t then t,, y)) = t by Lemma 2.1(e). On the other 
(F(t,, . . . , t,,, y)) = t. From ( Fex,) = t and Lemma 2.1(a) we obtain 
, t,, y)) = t for exactly one value e(y) and so we may conclude 
., t,,)=y)=t. 0 
We call a formula A of 5?(f) f-global if every occurrence off in A is of the form 
fh-. . , t,) with global terms t,, _ . . , t,. Let A be an f-global atomic formula. We 
construct a formula y(A) of 5’ by induction on the number of occurrences off in 
A. If f does not occur in A then y(A) is A. Otherwise there is some occurrence 
f(t I,“’ t,) such that the global terms t, , . . . , t,l do not contain$ Let B be the atomic 
formula which results from A by replacing this occurrence off by some global 
variable z not contained in A. Then we let y(A) be the formula 
3z(F(t,, . . - , 43, d A Yew. 
The mapping y can inductively be extended to all f-global formulas of S?( f) in the 
canonical way: ~(-IA) = -y(A), y(A+ B) = y(A)+ y(B), and so on for all the 
other connectives. 
ma 2.5. Let A be an f-global formula of 9?( f ). A is a theorem of T(f) ifi y(A) 
is a theorem of T. 
roof. Let K be a model of T( f ). We first show for atomic f-global A: 
(*) (y(A;! fez: ;;vzry i~k$,. 
This runs by induction on the definition of y(A). If f does not occur in A 
then y(A) is A and (*) is trivial. Otherwise, y(A) is 3z( F( t, , . . . , t,$, z) A y(B)) 
and we may assume (y(B)) for every i. As in the proof of Lemma 2.4 
we have -,tn,fOt ,..., tn)))=c so if K;(A) = a then 
vtnrf(t,,..., t,,WW=t. By Lemma 2.1(b) we obtain 
., t,,,z)AB))=lt and hence -(y(A)) = 8. If, on the other hand, 
(A))=t then we z))) =$ and obtain 
mma 2.1(e) we obtain 
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emf(~, , * * - 3 t,))) =t and hence 
does not contain z anymore. 
since B( f( t, , . . . , f,)) is just A and 
Being proved for atomic A, (*) can now easily be extended to arbitrary f-global 
A. This follows from ihe canonical definition o pie: y(OA) is O?(A) 
(y(OA)), where we 
have used as an induction hypothesis that (*) holds for A. The other cases run 
analogously. 
Now let i = 0 or i E No. We have just proved that .( y( A)) which means 
that A is a theorem of T(f) iff y(A) is a theorem of T(f). y(A) no longer contains 
f, so, by Lemma 2.3, if y(A) is a theorem of T(f) then it is also a theorem of T. 
Since every theorem of T is clearly a theorem of T(f), the proof is completed. Cl 
3bviously, the process of extending a temporal theory T by the definition of some 
f can be iterated. We call a theory an extension of T by dejnitions if it is obtained 
by successively extending T by definition of finitely many function symbols 
fi ,_A9 . . . ,A,, and denote it by T(J, ~. . . ,A,,) = (Z’(f,, . . . ,_LA d(f,,. - . ,J;d. Fur- 
thermore, given a model of T, the corresponding extension * * * JJ of 
can be successively constructed. Iterated apphcation of the above considerations 
then yield the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.6. Let T be a temporal rheory and T’ an exten.iion of T by dejinitions. 
(a) For every f-global formula A of T’, a formula y(A) of T can be constructed 
such that A is a theorem qf T’ if and only if y(A) is a theorem of T. 
(b) For any model qf T there is a unique extension which is a model of 
T’, viz. the corresponding extension as described above. 
Finally, we are now also able to formalize our informal notion of “describability” 
(of arithmetic in temporal logic) mentioned in Section 1. Part (a) of Theorem 2.6 
expresses that function symbols which can be introduced into a theory T as definitions 
in the way described do not really enrich T, formulas with these symbols (not applied 
on terms with local variables) can be translated in such without their carrying the 
same “meaning”. So, particularly, if we restrict the language of the extended theory 
to its kernel, then any subtheory using only this first-order language (or, more 
generally, any “equivalent*’ one) can be interpreted in T. This observation is compre- 
hended in the following formal definition. Let T = (9, .&‘) be a first-order theory and 
T’ a temporal theory. We call T interpretabie in T’ if there is an extension T” = (Y’, d”) 
of T’ by definitions such that (without loss of generality we may assume that) 2 is 
the kernel of 9” and every theorem of T is a theorem of T”. 
ask theories TAinit ZNTI 
Let, for the rest of this paper, be a first-order al lar,,uage wi 
empty signature and the restricbe ~a~t~~catio~ e now want to 
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interpretability of the arithmetic theories of Section 1 in temporal theories. Actually 
the situation is slightly di5erent according to which semantical framework (initial 
or normal) is underlying. Let us begin with treating the case of initial semantics 
since the basic idea how to proceed is quite simple here. 
We want to find a temporal theory with the language .& in which we can somehow 
“represent” the natural numbers. Let us distinguish one of the local variables of 
.&,, call it num, and consider the sequence 
given by some temporal structure Let us simply try to acZeve that this sequence 
represents the sequence i3, 1, 2, . . . of natural nu_nbers. For this we only have to 
provide that the elements of the sequence are pairwise different and cover all the 
desired objects. This is formally performed by defining the theory TAinit = (Lf&,, dinit) 
where &nit is the set of the following two axioms: 
(TAi 1) Vx0 num = x, 
(TAi2) Vxtl(num = x + OQnum f x). 
Let N be the structure for the kernel of 5?@, with /NI = No. 
Lemma 3.1. (a) TAinit has u model K = (N, &, W). 
(b) For every model K’ = (S, f, W’) of TAinit, S and N are isomorphic. 
Proof. (a) Let 5 be arbitrary and W = {q,, ql,. . .} with q(num) = i for i E NO. Then 
obviously (TAil) and (TAi2) are valid in K = (N, 6, W), hence K is a model Of TAinit s 
(b) If we define the mapping IJ!J :I$,+ ISI by q+(i) = qi(num) then we have: If 
t,!t(i) = +(j) then q:(num) = qj(num), hence i =J by (TAi2). So Cc, is injective. $ is 
also surjective since if d E 1st then because of (TAil) there exists i with T:( num) = d, 
hence e(i) = d. q 
This lemma shows that TAinit in fact represents (uniquely up to isomorphic 
mappings) the natural numbers, still without any functions. It should be quite clear, 
however, that we can also define 0 and s in TAinits This is formally justified by the 
next lemma. 
emma 3.2. The formulas 3,yjnum = y) and Vx3,yCl (num = x + 0 num = y) are 
theorems of TAinit. 
oof. Let ) be a model of TAi,it, W = {qO, ql,. . .}. If we choose 
= (8 5’, ) with 5’ = Y 5 and t’(Y) = 77”( num) then we obtain b( num = y) = C, 
and in order to achieve this the choice of 5’ is unique. So the first formula is a 
theorem. For the second one, let K’= (S, f, with t’ ==X ,$. We have to show that 
~(3,ylJ(num = x + Onum = y)) = t. From (TAil) we deduce that there is a smallest 
:( num = x) = t, hence i( num = x) = f for 0~j < i. Fror,l (TAi2) we obtain 
x + OClnum # x) I( num = x + OOnum f x) = t. Together 
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l(Unum f X) n t which means I( num = x) = f for j > i. Choose now 
) with 5” *_,, 5’ and r(u) = qi+l(num). This choice is obviously 
sufficient and unique for the above claim. q 
According to the considerations in Section 2 we can now build the extension 
TAi”i,(O, S) of TAinit with the additional axioms: 
(TAi3) num = 0, 
(TAi4) VxO(num =x+Omm = s(x)). 
TAi,it(O, s) represents the natural numbers including the constant and the successor 
function, i.e. the structure NMA = (N,, 0, s) introduced in Section 1. This is the first 
main result. 
Theorem 3.3. TAi,is(O, S) has a model ) and for every model 
(S, 5’9 ‘) of TAi,ig(O, s), S and A/MA are isomorphic. 
Proof. Consider the model = (Al, 4, W) of TAinit constructed in the proof of Lemma 
3.1(a). The extended K(0, s) = (S, 6, according to Theorem 2.6(b) is a model of 
TAi,i,(O, S) and S is just NM* since S(O)=q,(num)=O and S(s)(i)=i+l, hence 
S(s) = S. If K’= (SV t’, W’) is any model of TAi,it(O, S) then 
the restriction S’ of S to the language .& is a model of VAinit, hence S’ and N are 
isomorphic realized by a bijective mapping Cc, : No+ IS’ efined as in the proof of 
Lemma 3.1(b). Because of Theorem 2.6(b), K’ is just ‘(0, s’ and from this it is 
easily calculated that 9(O) = S(0) and +( s( i)) = S( s)( +( i)) which means that S and 
NMA are isomorphic. q 
Furthermore we obta;;l our first interpretability result. 
Theorem 3.4. In the framework of initial semantics, MA is interpretable in TAinit. 
Proof. We may assume that 9 MA is the kernel of Z&(0, s). Let A be a theorem of 
MA and = (S, 6, W) a model of TAi”i,(O, s). By Theorem 3.3, and MA are 
isomorphic. A is valid in NI\IIA, hence valid in S and also in So A is a theorem 
Of TAi”it(O, S). 0 
Turning to the framework of normal semantics, the situation is not that simple, 
mainly because there is no “d.irect access” to the initial element of However, 
we can again represent the natural numbers over .J&, by a somewhat modified 
construction (cf. [7]). We distinguish now two local variables, call them zero and 
num, and define the theory TA.,,, = (&, &,,,) where &,,, is the set of the 
following three axioms: 
(TAnl) Vx(zero=x+O zero==), 
(TAn2) Vx 0 (num = x A 0 num # zero), 
y(num =I 110num = y A yz zero*O(raum =x-Onurn =:s.)). 
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Note that (7Anl) forces zero to have the same value for all 77 E so we could 
have taken zero as a global variable. But it is technically more convenient to take 
it as local variable.. 
are isomorphic. 
let 4 =Ij(j+ 1). Choose 6 arbitrarily and let 
for every i, qi,( num) = 0 for every j and qi,+k( num) = k 
for 4 < 4 f k < ii+!. More informally, this means that the sequence 
q,Jnum), q,( num), . . . is defined to be 
,2,Q, 1,2,3, . . - . 
Obviously, (TAnl )-(TAn3) are valid in K = (N, 5, ), hence is a model of TA,,,, . 
(b) Let &( zero) be some element &E ISI. We define the mapping + : No+ ISI 
inductively by $(O) = d,, $(i + 1) = qk+ I( num) where k is the smallest k > 0 with 
gn(num) = t/t(i) and -r~~,,(num) f do which exists according to (TAn2). By construc- 
tion and because of (TAn3) which implies that if vj(num) = e(i) and qj+,( num) # do 
for j # k then qj+t(ntam) = ~~~+,(num), + is injective. Let now d E [Sl. If d = do then 
d = t/t(O). If d # do then, because of (TAn2), we can find i and k with q;(num) = d,, 
qi+j( num) # do for 1 <j G k and q,+k(num) = d. Then d = $(k) because of (TAn3) 
and the construction of ~9. Hence + is also surjective. Cl 
Lemma 3.6. Tlae formulas 3,y Cl zero = y and Vx3,y Cl (num = x A 0 num # zero + 
0 num = y) are lheorems of TA,,,,, . 
roof. Let = (S, 5, W) be a model of TA,,,, , = (T,,~ 7, , . . .}. The validity of 
the first formula in K is trivial since vi(zero) = qj(zero) for all i, j because of (TAnl) 
and so we may choose t’(y) = qO( zero). For the second formula, let K’ = (S, s’, W) 
with 5’ =.rc & We have to show that f(3,yO(num =x A Onum # zero+Onum = 
y))=t for every iENo. From (TAn2) we deduce that there is a smallest j with 
.i( num = x) = t and j+,( num # zero) = t. Taking e”(y) = yi+,( num) proves the 
clirim since this choice is unique and consistent (for all i) because of (TAn3). El 
This lemma enables us again to build an extension TA,,,,(O, s) of TA.,,, with 
the additional axioms 
(TAn4) zero = 0, 
(TAn5) Vx( num = x A Onum # O+ Onum = s(x)). 
By analogous proofs as for Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 (using now Lemma 3.5 and again 
Theorem 2.6(b)), we obtain the same results as before. 
3.7. TA.,,,(O, s) has 
‘) of TA,,,,(O, s), S an 
) and for every model 
In the framework of normal semanrics, A is interpretable i:z TA,,,,. 
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We now show that we can also define addition and multiplication in our basic 
temporal theories if we allow the more powerful quantification (V*). Beginning with 
addition, the basic idea (essentially appearing already in [5]) is to simulate an 
iterative computation (based on 0 and s) of some x+y on two local variables a 
and b which are (informally) to have the following consecutive values: 
a: x,x+l,x+2,...,x+y ,... 
b: y,y-l,y-2 ).“, 0 ,.... 
To be more formal, let J-Z: be as in Section 3 but with quantification (V*). We take 
TA as a short-hand for TAinil or TA,,,,, respectively, according to which semantical 
framework is given and let TA* and TA*(O, s) be the theories as in Section 3 with 
Z!$ being replaced by 9:. 
Let F&X, y, z) be the formula 
3a3b[a=x~b=y~Cl((b=O+a=z) 
~(b#O+VuVu(a=u~b=u-*O(a=s(u)~s(b)=u))))]. 
Lemma 4.1. In the framework of initial semantics, the formula VxVy3,zFtidd(x, y, z) 
is a theorem of TA*(O, s). 
We give 5’ and .> with 6 ==,t and 
a) and T,;(b) are defi 
17&(a) =4(x), q;(b) = t(v J. 
if qj(b)=S(O) then $+,(a) and a),;+,(b) are arbitrary, 
else T;+,(a) - S(s)(Ti(a)) and q:+,(b) = H 
where d is the (unique) element of ISi with S(s)(d) = q;(b). 
Because of Theorem 3.3, there is a smallest k such that vi(b) = S(O). We let 
t’(z) = vi(a). Obviously, Fad,, is valid in = (8 5’, ) and the construction of 
t’(z) is unique. Cl 
This lemma implies that we can take Fadd for the definition of a new function 
symbol, obviously intended to mean addition, in the case of initial semantics. In 
fact, the same Fad,, can be taken in normal semantics. 
ma .2. In the framework OJ’ normal semantics, the formula 
VxVy3, z Cl Fadd(x, y, z) is a theorem of TA*(O, s). 
) and i, TEN{,, i’s i. Define ’ as in the proof of Lemma 
ce of starting the induction at j = i’ and not at j = 0. Again, 
there is a smallest k such that now r]i,+c,( b) = 
So again the unique definition c’(z) = q:(a) ma 
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Thus, in both semantics we are able to build the extension TA*(O, s, +) of TA*(O, s) 
with the additional axiom 
VA+) ~x~YLI,(x, Y, X+Y) 
and, of course, we can do the same now with multiplication. e simulate an iterative 
computation of x * j: as follows: 
t.3: 0, x, x+x,x+x+x ,...) x*y ,..‘ 
b: Y,Y-~,Y--~,Y-39 . . . ) 0 , . . . . 
Formally, we define (in the extended language Z’$(O, s, +) of TA*(O, s, +)) the 
formula F,,,,(x, y, z) to be 
&x3b[a=OAb=yt\[7((b=O+a=z) 
h(bfO+VUtlv(a= u A b = tr+O(a = u-9-x A s(b) = v))))]. 
It is obvious that, with quite similar proofs as above, we again obtain the validity 
of the both extension formulas of Frnult. 
3. l-he formulas vxvy3, ZF mud~ Y, d and VX~Y%ZO Cdx, Y, ~1 are 
theorems of TA*(O, s, +) in initial and normal semantics, respectively. 
Therefore we finally can build the extension TA*(O, s, +, *) of TA*(O, s, +) and, 
hence, of TA* with the additional axiom 
VA*) ~x~yK,,,(x, Y, x * Y). 
Analogously to the theorems in Section 3 we now obtain the main results about the 
models of TA*(O, s, +, *) and the interpretability of (complete) Peano arithmetic in 
TA”. 
ThC!Q 4.4. TA*(O, s, +, *) has a model ) and for every model K’ = 
WJ ‘) of TA*(O, s, +, *), S and NPA are isomorphic. 
roof. We may start wit emodelK=(&,,,,, ) of TA(0, s) given in 
3 or 3.7, respectively. is also a model of 0, s). The extended 
) according to Theorem 2.6(b) is a model of TA*(O, s, f, *) and clearly S 
‘) is any model of TA*(O, s, +, *) then the 
restrtction S’ 0 orphic to NM, because of Theorems 3.3 or 
3.7. With Theorem 2.6(b) and according to the construction of Fadd and I=,,,,,, it is 
easy to see that this implies that S and PA are isomorphic. Cl 
0th PA and CPA are interpretable in TA” (i.e. in TA$i, ot TA&,,, 
according to initial or normal semantics, respectively). 
nguage L?$(O, s, +9 8). 
are isomorphic by 
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Theorem 4.4. Any theorem A of CPA or PA is valid in 
and is therefore also a theorem of TA*(O, s, +, *). 0 
and in 
In this paper we have, by adaption from classical first-order logic, developed a 
technique of extending first-order temporal theories (i.e. theories over first-order 
temporal languages) by definitions of new function (including constant) symbols. 
(It should be clear that the analogous technique could also be used to introduce 
new predicate symbols.) This technique enabled us to precisely define the notion 
of interpretability of a classical first-order theory in a temporal one. 
Applying the formal instruments to some first-order arithmetics we showed: 
- Minimal arithmetic MA is interpretable in a temporal theory TA over a temporal 
language with empty signature and quantification allowed only over global vari- 
ables (Theorems 3.4 and 3.8). 
- Peano arithmetic PA and complete Peano arithmetic CPA are interpretable in a 
temporal theory TA* over a temporal language with empty signature if quan- 
tification is also allowed over local variables (Theorem 4.5). 
- The appropriate axioms of TA snd TA* depend on which semantics (normal or 
initial) is underlying. 
Moreover, we obtained some caregoricify results. Let us call a structure S to be a 
model structure of a temporal theory T if there exists a model 
We may then call T categorical if every two model structures of T are isomorphic. 
With these notions, Lemmas 3.1 and 3.5 and Theorems 3.3, 3.7 and 4.4 can be 
summarized as follows. 
- The standard models of arithmetic, IV, NMA, NPA, are model structures of TA 
and TA* and the respective extensior;s by 0, s and f, *. All these theories are 
categorical. 
Finally we note that we also obtain a new incompleteness result for first-order 
temporai logic with equality. In [7] it was shown that this logic is incomplete (cannot 
be axiomatized in a finitistic way) if the temporal anguage (with (t/)-quantification) 
contains (at least) a constant (0), a unary (s) and two binary function symbols 
(+, *). (In another paper [S], incompleteness is shown for langklages with empty 
signature but with denumerably many local propositional variables and some binary 
temporal operator like unril. So this is not comparable with the situation in 171 and 
the present one.) The result of [7] can be strengthened as follows. 
There is no sound and complete jiniiisfic axiomahzation of jirsr-order 
temporal logic with equality (with 0 and Cl) in each of ~~e~~~lo~ling IWC cases: 
(a) 7%e language allows quantijcation only over globd variabkc an 
least Iwo binary? ~~~c~iQ~ symbols. 
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(6) The language allows quant$cation over global and local variables and has an 
arbitrary ( partrcu!ar~y empty) sigmture, 
runs just as in [7]. In any case, the symbols 0 and s can be defined. 
allowed qjuantification, + and * can be defined (case (b)) or have 
to be symbols of the language (case (a)). 0 
Besides its concrete results, this paper should also stimulate a more detailed 
investigation of (particularly “model theoretic” aspects of) temporal theories which 
not always behave exactly like classical first-order theories. This would be interesting 
for the application of temporal logic in the field 3 1’ system specification. Such a 
specification is given by temporal logic formulas (axioms) and, hence, is nothing 
but just a temporal theory in the sense defined here. An elaborated temporal model 
theory could provide useful insights into the formal semantics of specifications. 
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